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Despite concerted international cooperation and action, including the
deployment of various national and international naval forces in the region,
piracy, in particular off the coast of Somalia, continues to pose a serious
threat to the peace and security of one of the most-traveled waterways in
the world, the neighboring states, and to the global economy.
Naval deterrence depends on effective patrolling, which again is
closely tied to the concept of jurisdiction and law enforcement. As a point
of departure, piracy is considered to be the original universal jurisdiction
crime and, as such, states apprehending pirates would be able to base their
jurisdiction on that concept. However, in practice, states patrolling the Gulf
of Aden have shied away from prosecuting, sometimes even from arresting,
suspected pirates due to anticipated legal difficulties of prosecution, high
expenses connected with transporting suspects to the national courts of the
apprehending forces, and concerns of potential asylum claims being made
by pirates.
Some of those claims may be rejected based on the Exclusion Clause
in Article IF of the 1951 Refugee Convention, stipulating that refugee
status may be denied to persons who have committed certain serious crimes.
The majority of arrests, however, by necessity pertains to unsuccessful
pirates and hence involves inchoate acts on the grounds of which a potential
asylum claim, nevertheless, may not as readily be denied.
While failure to adequately address the problem of piracy on the high
seas may reinforce the threat to security in the region and beyond,
insufficiently prepared prosecutions in the various cooperating states'
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national courts may add to the fear of not only harboring a pirate, and
lending incentives to future ones, but potentially in this fashion inviting
criminal gangs, or sleeper cells, with even more serious agendas into the
country. Assessing the legal basis of those fears and evaluating ways to
counter the level of threat posed by piracy will be at the core of this article.
I. CONTINUING THREAT

To be sure, although pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia accounted,
by far, for the greatest share of all attacks in recent years, piracy is not an
unknown phenomenon in the waters off Bangladesh, India, Indonesia,
Nigeria, and Tanzania, and thus may be said to constitute a serious global
The
problem with potentially significant geopolitical repercussions.
dubious honor of being recognized as a state belonging to a piracy-infested
region adds to the weak state/failed state paradigm, and increases pressure
towards falling into the latter category of that continuum. Having a piracy
problem in one's backyard exposes the inadequacy of the coastal state's
patrolling, policing, and prosecutorial capacity and capability; thus, further
undermining the legitimacy of an already weak government and risking
pushing it even closer to the failed state label.
The near global attention Somalia has been receiving in recent years
has in the main been due to the fact that it fits the failed state label all too
well. Hence, in spite of increasing international cooperation and navalmilitary action, piracy, in particular off the coast of Somalia, continues to
threaten the safety, peace, and security of one of the most-frequented
waterways in the world, the states in the region, and, by extension, to
disrupt the global economy.
According to recent numbers, an estimated 21,000 ships pass through
the Gulf of Aden on an annual basis. While the number of acts of piracy
and armed robbery against ships' reported to the IMO to have occurred in
2009 was 406, against 306 during 2008 and 282 during 2007, the first
four months of 2010 alone resulted in 135 reported incidents (and thus on a

"Piracy" as defined in Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
1.
the Sea (UNCLOS) in the main consists of "any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship . . . and
directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship. . ." or "against a ship .. .outside the jurisdiction of
any State." United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 101, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS]. Armed robbery against ships pertains to a similar
description of unlawful acts taking place "within a State's jurisdiction over such offences." Cf Int'l
Maritime Org. [IMO], Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed
Robbery Against Ships, Res. A 1025(26), annex (Dec. 2, 2009), IMO Doc. A 26/Res 1025 (Jan. 18,
2010).
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par with the 2009 peak level)2 and a decisive reversal of the trend currently
still seems to be quite distant. Taking the extra costs to international
shipping due to significantly increased insurance premiums, avoidance (i.e.,
choosing the alternate route around the Cape of Good Hope, which adds
roughly 3,500 miles to the journey), and deterrence (e.g., heightening
onboard security, deploying frigates, etc.) into account, estimates of the
direct and indirect costs of piracy to the global trade range from $1 billion
to $16 billion.' In light of those realities, the IMO pursued a three-pronged
approach, aiming at: (1) enhancing individual vessels' security and alert
level, (2) increasing regional cooperation, and (3) promoting international
military presence in the predominantly affected Gulf of Aden area.
Thus, on September 29, 2009, the IMO's Maritime Safety Committee
(MSC) updated and revised its guidance on combating piracy and armed
robbery against ships and adopted best management practices to deter and
deal with attacks.4
The guidelines include, for example, various
recommendations with respect to travel routes, manning of engine rooms
and lookouts, and more technical advice relating to preferred modes of
communication and reporting, evasive maneuvering tactics, and fire pump
defensive measures. One of the newest tools in regard to evasion and
prevention pertains to a specifically designed electronic sea map, with live
updates on suspected pirate vessels, weather reports and other observations
plotted in and made available to subscribing ship owners.s As of today,
such mapping and reporting is mainly carried out individually, within each
shipping company. Despite enhanced on-board security, in light of the still
high-level security threat, the by far preferred modus operandi to most ship
owners would be to avoid the piracy infested shipping lanes off the Somali
coast all together and instead employ alternative routes, for example, going
around South Africa. But, as most shipping companies individually admit,
no one wants to go the extra (sea-) mile alone. Unless the majority of

2.
See Maritime Safety Committee [MSC], MSC 87th Sess. (May 12-24, 2010), available at
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/MSC/Pages/MSC-87th-Session.aspx (last visited
Feb. 16, 2011); Maritime Safety Committee [MSC], Revised Guidance on Combating Piracy Agreed by
IMO Maritime Safety Committee, MSC 86th Sess. (May 27-June 5, 2009), available at
http://www.imo.org/newsroom/mainframe.asp?topicid=1773&doc id=11478 (last visited Feb. 16,
2011).
3.

PETER CHALK, THE MARITIME DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURY: TERRORISM,

PIRACY AND CHALLENGES FOR THE UNITED STATES 16 (RAND Corp., 2008), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND MG697.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
Int'l Maritime Org. [IMO], Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy in the Gulf of
4.
Aden, IMO Doc. MSC, 1/Circ., 1335 (Sept. 29, 2009).
5.

See, e.g., Sjoreverkart som skal hindre angrep [Piracy Map to Avoid Attacks],

AFTENPOSTEN, Aug. 5, 2010.
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companies collectively follow through with such plans, no one wants to
carry the extra cost to competitiveness, spending more time and fuel on a
substantially longer journey.6
As to fostering regional cooperation and coordinating governments'
action, the IMO adopted a Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes
of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (Code of Practice), which,
inter alia, urges governments to take action, in accordance with the Code,
to investigate all acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships occurring
in areas or on-board ships under their jurisdiction, and to report to the
Organization pertinent information on all investigations and prosecutions
concerning such acts. Apart from encouraging states to take necessary
national legislative, judicial, and law enforcement action as to be able to
receive, prosecute, or extradite any pirates or suspected pirates and armed
robbers arrested by warships or military aircraft,8 the Code is meant to be a
source of best practice and "to provide Member States with an aidemimoire to facilitate the investigation of the crimes of piracy and armed
robbery against ships."9
Furthermore, in January 2009 the lIO convened a meeting in Djibouti
of states in the region, adopting a Code of Conduct Concerning the
Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western
Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (the so-called Djibouti Code of
Conduct),10 in which the signatories declared their intention to cooperate to
the fullest possible extent, and in a manner consistent with international
law, in the repression of such attacks against ships. The state signatories
committed themselves towards sharing and reporting relevant information
through a system of national focal points and information centers,
interdicting ships suspected of engaging in acts of piracy and other attacks
against ships, ensuring that persons committing or attempting to commit
such prohibited acts are apprehended and prosecuted, and facilitating
6.
See, e.g., Avverget piratangrep mot norsk skip i Adenbukta [Fought off Pirate Attack
against NorNegian Vessel in the GulfofAden], AFTENPOSTEN, Aug. 4, 2010. That point was further
underlined by the head of the Norwegian Ship Owner's Association on the occasion of a recent
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs conference. See Norwegian Institute of Int'l Affairs
[NUPI], Agenda 2010: Responsibility and GlobalGovernance, Oslo, Norway (Sept. 16, 2010).
7.
Int'l Maritime Org. [IMO], Code of Practices for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy
and Armed Robbery Against Ships, IMO Assembly Res. A 1025(29), Annex (Dec. 2, 2009).
8.

Id. art. 3.1.

9.

Id. art. 1.

10.
Int'l Maritime Org. [IMO], The Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy
and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden, IMO 101st Sess.
(Jan. 26-29, 2009), available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf9/piracy-djibouti-meeting
(last visited Feb. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Djibouti Code ofConduct].
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proper care, treatment, and repatriation for affected crews and passengers,
particular those who have been subjected to violence.
More specifically, according to Article 8 of the Djibouti Code of
Conduct, in order to facilitate information sharing and coordination,
participating states are requested to use the piracy information exchange
centers established in Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen, respectively.
Furthermore, in order to allow for the prosecution, conviction, and
punishment of those involved in piracy or armed robbery against ships, and
to facilitate extradition, or handing over when prosecution is not possible,
each participating state declared its intention "to review its national
legislation with a view towards ensuring that there are national laws in
place to criminalize piracy and armed robbery . .. and adequate guidelines
for the exercise of jurisdiction, conduct of investigations, and prosecutions
of alleged offenders.""
Acknowledging that the current Djibouti Code of Conduct is mainly of
declaratory value, Article 13 expresses the participating states' intention to
consult, "within two years of the effective date of this Code of Conduct ...
with the assistance of IMO, with the aim of arriving at a binding

agreement."l

2

Finally, realizing that successful regional cooperation also would
depend on international naval assistance, the IMO has been at the forefront
of organizations and states to bring the piracy problem to the attention of
the UN Security Council,13 which, on November 23, 2010, adopted its latest
enforcement action resolution concerning the situation in Somalia.14
Recalling its previous resolutions with regard to Somalia,"s in UN SC Res.
1950 the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
decided to renew for an additional twelve months the authorization granted
to Member States in preceding resolutions, pertaining to taking action
against pirates in Somali territorial waters ("hot pursuit"16 ) and extending
11.

Id. art. 11.

12.

Djibouti Code of Conduct, supranote 10, art. 13.

Tom Syring, Recent Developments: UNCHR and IMO Address Plightof Refugees at Sea,
13.
New Threats Loom, INT'L MARITIME ORG. [IMO], available at http://www.asil.org/rio/imo.html (last
visited Feb. 16, 2011).
14.

S.C. Res. 1950, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1950 (Nov. 23, 2010).

S.C. Res. 1897, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1814, U.N. Doc.
15.
S/RES/1814 (May 15, 2008); S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1838,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1844, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1844 (Nov. 20, 2008); S.C.
Res. 1846, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16,
2008).
16.
In other words, allowing pirates to be chased from the high seas into Somali territorial
waters, thus preventing pirates' "hit-and-run" tactics.
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the scope of permissible military force even to certain land-based
operations in the Somalia mainland." This UN SC Res. 1950 also focused
on holding persons suspected of piracy accountable for their acts by calling
for increased efforts to prosecute Somali pirates.' 8
Based on these resolutions, states have intensified their presence in the
Gulf of Aden, with the United States, United Kingdom, French, and Indian
navies initially leading the way, now also joined, for example, by a Chinese
naval deployment, and the first-ever European Union-led naval force
(EUNAVFOR) executing operation "Atalanta."l 9 With presence, however,
comes the problem of effective patrolling, which again is closely tied to the
concept of jurisdiction and law enforcement. As a point of departure,
piracy is considered to be the original universal jurisdiction crime and, as
such, states apprehending pirates would be able to base their jurisdiction on
that concept. 20 However, in practice, states patrolling the Gulf of Aden
have shied away from prosecuting, sometimes even from arresting,21
suspected pirates due to anticipated legal difficulties and expenses. Yet,
without serious and visible efforts at prosecution and punishment, the
preventive and deterring effect of increased patrols is at best reduced.
Some of the main concerns of states pertain to the rather small window
of opportunity for catching suspected persons "in the act," 22 and the

17.
The resolution noted that it was passed with the consent of, and following several requests
for international assistance from, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia. See S.C. Res.
1950, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1950 (Nov. 23, 2010). UN SC Res. 1851 had noted in paragraph 6 that "States
and regional organizations cooperating in the fight against piracy . .. off the coast of Somalia . . . 'may
undertake all necessary measures that are appropriatein Somalia, for the purpose of suppressing acts of
piracy. . . ." S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008).
18. In paragraph 13, the Security Council "[c]alls on all States, including States in the region,
to criminalize piracy under their domestic law and favorably consider the prosecution of suspected, and
imprisonment of convicted, pirates apprehended off the coast of Somalia, consistent with applicable
international human rights law." S.C. Res. 1950, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1950 (Nov. 23, 2010). See also J.
Ashley Roach, Agora: Piracy Prosecutions-CounteringPiracy Off Somalia: InternationalLaw and
InternationalInstitutions, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 397, 407 (2010).
19.
Established according to EU Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP (Nov. 10, 2008)
framework, 2008 O.J. (L 301) 8.
20.
UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 105 (establishing the right of every State to sieze a pirate
ship and prosecute acts of piracy).
21.
Marie Woolf, Pirates Can Claim UK Asylum, SUNDAY TIMES, Apr. 13, 2008,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article3736239.ece (last visited Feb. 23, 2011) (noting that in
2008, the British Foreign Office reportedly instructed the Royal Navy not to turn pirates over to
Somalia, in fact, not to take them on-board at all, due to concerns they could claim asylum under
European human rights laws).
22.
Often, there are no more than fifteen minutes between a pirate attack being launched and
the action being concluded.
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problematic status of pirates. Prior to the launch, a pirate vessel may
merely appear as a fishing boat and by quickly disposing of weapons by
throwing them overboard, any evidence to the contrary soon rests safely on
the seabed. On the other hand, under international law pirates are
considered to be non-combatants,2 3 which put, for example, further
constraints on navies' "rules of engagement." Furthermore, the modalities
of apprehension may impose additional difficulties on any ensuing
prosecutions; as many pirates are detained under circumstances that
resemble the battlefield conditions criticized in regard to the apprehension
of many Guantdinamo Bay detainees, "where evidence was not collected or
preserved as required for prosecution."24
Realizing the shortcomings and limitations of increased naval presence
in the face of the 2009 attacks on the U.S. vessels Maersk Alabama and
Liberty Sun, a new legal initiative in the United States, building upon the
IMO's guidelines with respect to enhancing vessels' security level, intends
to allow other mariners to defend their vessels and be protected by law
when doing so. The U.S. Mariner and Vessel Protection Act of 2009,25 if
passed, would provide U.S. Mariners with immunity in U.S. Courts if they
wound or kill pirates whilst responding to a pirate attack. The Act,
proposed by Rep. Frank LoBiondo, charges the U.S. Coast Guard with
certifying firearms training for merchant vessels and provides for any
trained mariner using force plus owner, operator, or master of the respective
vessels to be exempted from liability in U.S. Courts as a result of such use
of force. Furthermore, the Act directs the United States to negotiate
international agreements through the IMO to provide similar exemptions
from liability in other countries for the use of force by mariners and vessel
owners, operators, or masters, as well as to ensure that armed U.S. crews
can enter foreign ports. It also contains plans to authorize deployment of
Coast Guard Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST) to ride aboard
and defend U.S. flagged vessels transiting piracy prone waters. The
initiative is carried in an amendment to the National Defense Authorization
Act.

23.
See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, InternationalLegal Responses to Piracyoff the Coast of
Somalia, 13 AM. Soc. INT'L L. 2 (2009).
24.
John R. Crook, ContemporaryPracticeof the UnitedStates Relating to InternationalLaw:
Closing Guantdnamo Proves Difficult-Khadr'sMilitary Commission Trial Set for August, 104 AM. J.
INT'L L. 506-07 (2010). Cf Charlie Savage, No TerrorEvidence Against Some Detainees, N.Y. TIMES,
May 29, 2010, at A12.
25.
United States Mariner and Vessel Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 2984, 111th Cong. (2009)
(introduced on June 19, 2009, referred to the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global
Counterterrorism on July 7, 2009).
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II. BLURRY LINES TO LACONIA

While all attempts at containing the threats posed by piracy, in general,
are laudable endeavors, the various initiatives and measures, initiated or
adopted by the IMO and other national and international actors, display
shortcomings to varying degrees. The Code of Practice represents little
more than a handbook for investigating piracy crimes, stating best practices,
but containing few commitments on the part of participating states.
Likewise, the Djibouti Code of Conduct enlists important coordination and
cooperation obligations, but a legally binding agreement is not to be
expected until 2011. The MSC guidelines, on the other hand, include
various immediately practical recommendations in regard to combating
piracy and armed robbery; although, the success of those measures also
depends, to a certain extent, on the participation and coordination of
international naval forces. Finally, considering dependence on (foreign)
military cooperation, measures such as those stipulated in the U.S. Mariner
and Vessel Protection Act of 2009 may be understandable. However,
manning civilian vessels with armed seafarers (and encouraging the use of
force to fight off presumed pirates with pledges of liability exemptions),
may lead, once again, to a dangerously blurry line between civilians and
combatants, while concomitantly contributing to an escalation of violence
on the high seas. What had once been realized as a lethal dilemma of
international law, culminating in the Laconia affair during World War 11,26
might still be a non-commendable idea in the present circumstances.
In any case, ultimately, as also UN SC Res. 1897 acknowledges, a
solution to piracy off the coast of Somalia lies ashore. That, however,
would require intense institution or even state building efforts which, in the
foreseeable future, does not seem feasible. In fact, despite years of
internationally supported capacity-building efforts, the weak so-called
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia has yet to manage to
agree upon the text of a badly needed new constitution;27 accommodating
the various competing clans, and barely controlling more than a fraction of
the capital Mogadishu, not to mention of the entire country-and even that
rather tiny bit of control is based on foreign support. Thus, as of now,
international patrolling, deterrence by apprehending and prosecuting, and

26.
Pertaining, roughly speaking, to the question of whether a submarine encountering an
(armed) merchant ship may treat that ship as a military vessel and its crew as combatants.
27.
The Project, MAX PLANCK INST. FOR COMP. PUB. L. & INT'L L., Mar. 16, 2011,
(last visited
http://www.mpil.de/ww/en/pub/research/details/knowtransfer/somalia/theprojects.cfin
Mar. 28, 2011) (establishing that ongoing procrastination and lack of progress has led the Max Planck
Institute, one of the legal capacity building partners, to characterize the constitution-drafting process as
"decelerating").
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capacity building in the (surrounding) region, seems the closest one may get
to enhancing the Somali state as such, hoping that regional spill-over effects
will eventually ensue and also positively affect Somalia.
III. PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Any efforts at combating piracy are additionally complicated by the
fact that even where pirates have been apprehended and apparently
sufficient evidence has been collected, most of the countries comprising the
international naval forces show little interest in actually prosecuting the
attackers, for fear of high expenses connected with transporting suspects to
the national courts of the apprehending forces, and concerns of potential
asylum claims being made by pirates. Instead, and in lack of an
international court alternative, transfer to a third country has been favored
as a compromise and, as of now, Somalia's neighbor Kenya has emerged as
the leading national location for piracy trials. Thus, in spite of the fact that
Article 105 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) 28 not only provides that "every State may seize a pirate ship"
on the high seas,2 9 but also stipulates that prosecution of the apprehended
suspects should be by "[t]he courts of the state which carried out the
seizure;"30 there suspected pirates have increasingly been transferred to
As part of the European Union-led operation
Kenyan authorities.
"Atalanta," in 2009 the EU, for example, concluded an agreement with the
government of Kenya for the transfer and trial of persons suspected of
having committed acts of piracy.3 1
A. ProsecutingPiracyunder InternationalLaw
But what exactly is the legal basis for piracy prosecutions, and is there
a duty to prosecute that pertains to all, or to certain states? As pointed out
above, the UNCLOS, in particular Article 105, may be employed to
28.

UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 105.

The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
29.
Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 222, 27 I.L.M. 672 (1988) (entered into force Mar. 1, 1992)
(demonstrating the basis of jurisdiction where pirates are not apprehended on the high seas, but for
example, following a "hot pursuit," have been seized in Somali territorial waters) [hereinafter SUA
Convention].
30.

UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 105 (emphasis added).

See Exchange of Letters on the Conditions and Modalities for the Transfer of Persons
31.
Suspected of Having Committed Acts of Piracy and Detained by the European Union-Led Naval Force
(EUNAVFOR), and Seized Property in the Possession of EUNAVFOR, from EUNAVFOR to Kenya
for Their Treatment After Such Transfer, EU-Kenya, Mar. 6, 2009, 2009 O.J. (L 79) 49, reprinted in 48
I.L.M. 751 (2009).
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establish a right of every state to seize a suspected pirate ship, apprehend,
and try suspected persons. That Convention, along with international
customary law both preceding and exceeding the ensuing codification of
some of the international norms governing maritime law, established
universal jurisdiction over acts of piracy.
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of
any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship
or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and
arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of
the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the
penalties to be imposed ... .32
Nothing in the UNCLOS, however, imposes a duty on State Parties to
prosecute, or, for that matter, any other legal obligations, save one: Article
100 of the UNCLOS, which underlines that "[a]ll States shall cooperate to
the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in
any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State."33 While everything
else appears voluntary, merely authorizing states to act, Article 100 may be
read as a specific obligation to act to repress piracy, although no particular
guidance is offered in the treaty text as to the nature of the required
cooperation. To be sure, when discussing earlier drafts of the UNCLOS
predecessor, the International Law Commission "had sought to put some
teeth" 34 into the relevant article pertaining to the duty to cooperate in its
commentary on draft Article 38, stipulating that "[a]ny State having an
opportunity of taking measures against piracy, and neglecting to do so,
would be failing in a duty laid upon it by international law." 35 However,
the draft article adds that "[o]bviously, the State must be allowed a certain
latitude as to the measures it should take to this end in any individual
case."36 Read against that backdrop, the latitude bestowed on states in
cooperating "to the fullest possible extent" in Article 100 of the UNCLOS
seems to be substantial and hence, even that obligation appears to be rather
vague. In sum, the legal basis for piracy prosecutions may be found in
customary international law and its codification in UNCLOS, Articles 105
and 100. However, neither customary international law, treaty law such as
32.

UNCLOS, supranote 1, art. 105 (emphasis added).

33.

UNCLOS, supranote 1, art. 100 (emphasis added).

34.

Roach, supranote 18, at 405.

Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Eighth Session, [1956] 2
35.
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, at 282, U.N. GAOR, Ilth Sess., Supp. No. 9, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956)
(commenting on the draft of'Article 38) [hereinafter ILC Report].
36.

Id.
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UNCLOS, nor the travaux prdparatoiresseem to impose a clear duty on
states to prosecute piracy.
Furthermore, prosecutions for certain piratical acts may also be based
on various, widely ratified international criminal law treaties, such as the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention),3 7 the International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages of 1979 (Hostages Convention),38 the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
of 1999 (Terrorism Financing Convention),39 and the United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000 (TOC
Convention).40 While none of these treaties address the boarding of
suspected pirate vessels, and as such maintain the traditional rule of
exclusivity of flag state jurisdiction, they potentially cover a broad range of
piracy support activities. Those include hostage taking of crews, acting as
an organized criminal group across borders, and, not least, the provision of
supplying equipment and funds to the entire criminal enterprise, without
which most pirate endeavors never would have seen the light of day,
considering the substantial investments necessary to acquire, for example,
rocket-propelled grenades and other sophisticated assault hardware.
If properly implemented under domestic law, these treaties may be
useful tools in the suppression of pirate activities. Yet, as of now they have
been virtually absent in any attempts at addressing piracy off the coast of
Somalia, or for that matter, elsewhere, and point to the challenges any
domestic prosecution faces, besides willingness on the part of states:
implementation of international treaties and adoption of modern national
laws governing the prosecution of piracy.
B. Domestic Proceedings
To date, there is no international court or other international institution
in existence which would have jurisdiction over the crime of piracy and
hence, domestic proceedings are the only feasible alternative. To be sure,
in theory the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) could
37.

SUA Convention, supranote 29.

38.
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S.
205, 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979).
39.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999,
G.A. Res. 54/109, 39 1.L.M. 270 (2000).
40.
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 108-16 (2004), 2225 U.N.T.S. 209. As of June 2010, the SUA Convention had 165
State Parties, the Hostage Convention had 167 parties, the Terrorism Financing Convention had 173
parties, and the TOC Convention had 155 parties.
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be amended such as to cover the crime of piracy. The mere thought of such
a proposal, however, met with significant opposition prior to the 2010
Review Conference of the ICC, and thus, was never really an option. Apart
from financial and organizational concerns, the gist of the argument against
inclusion of piracy and other treaty-based crimes, under the auspices of the
ICC, was a concern that it would overwhelm and trivialize the Court.
Considering that the ICC had been established to deal, according to its
Preamble, with the "most serious crimes of concern to the international
community," 41 the broadly conveyed sense was that, for all its potential
graveness, piracy per se did not, in general, rise to such a level of
seriousness from an international point of view. After all, for example, UN
SC Res. 1816 and 1838, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and
constituting enforcement action that presupposes a threat to peace and
security, did not actually regard piracy per se as constituting such a threat.
In fact, those resolutions more generally indicated "that the incidents of
piracy and armed robbery against vessels in the territorial waters of Somalia
and the high seas off the coast of Somalia exacerbate the situation in
Somalia which continues to constitute a threat against international peace
and security in the region."42
Piracy by itself was not deemed to represent a sufficiently serious
threat such as to endanger international peace and security and hence, as of
now, domestic prosecutions remain the sole venue for trying suspected
pirates.
Following UN SC Res. 1851 of December 16, 2008, where the
Security Council had urged states willing to prosecute piracy to enter into
agreements with states and organizations mainly involved in patrolling the
coast and physically involved in fighting piracy, Kenya concluded
agreements with, inter alia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the
European Union, and emerged as the hub of piracy prosecutions. In the
wake of those agreements, at least ten cases involving seventy-six
suspected pirates had been brought in the Mombasa courts as of August 31,
2009. Kenya's willingness appears to be in stark contrast to the rather
reluctant practice in that regard on the side of the states actively involved in
patrolling waters off the coast of Somalia.4 3 The emerging picture thus far

41.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl., July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90,
37 I.L.M. 999 (1998).
S.C. Res. 1838, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008) (emphasis added); S.C. Res. 1816,
42.
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008) (emphasis added).
43.
See generally United States v. Mus6, No. 9-CR-512 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 19, 2009)
(charging the defendant, inter alia, with piracy against the U.S.-flagged MIV Maersk Alabama on the
high seas and, armed with a firearm, hijacking it by force and detaining its captain in a lifeboat on or
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is that states taking part in the international naval presence in the Gulf of
Aden may, if at all," try suspected pirates who attack ships of those states'
nationality, or with nationals of those states being affected, for example, as
crew members. Where no such nexus may be established, avoidance of
active prosecution seems to be the general trend,45 sometimes to the
detriment of the apprehended persons. For example, in May 2010 the
Russian navy captured, and a few days later released, suspected pirates,
instead of bringing them in with a view to initiating proceedings. Rather,
the Somali men reportedly were released far at sea in a small rubber boat,
rendering their chances of survival uncertain.46
Overall, piracy
prosecutions in countries other than Kenya have thus far been almost
absent. However, recent refusal on the part of Kenya to continue accepting
pirates for trial, formally blamed on not having received the assistance in
bearing the burden of prosecution promised by its partners in the bilateral
agreements, may alter that trend. In fact, that refusal has already resulted in
a couple of recent indictments in, for example, both the United States4 7 and
Germany, 48 cases that otherwise would have been transferred to Kenya.
In April 2010, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of
Virginia announced the indictment of eleven men from Somalia on charges
that included piracy. Five were charged in connection with a failed
nighttime assault on March 31, 2010 on the USS Nicholas, a U.S. Navy
frigate that the attackers apparently mistakenly thought was an unarmed
merchant ship. The other six men were charged in connection with an
unsuccessful early morning attack on or about April 10, 2010 on the USS
about Apr. 8-12, 2009), Superseding Indictment (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 12, 2010) (adding a charge of
hijacking two non-U.S.-flagged ships before the Maersk Alabama).
44.
As an example to the contrary, i.e., despite the existence of such a nexus, in May 2010,
for example, the Russian navy released a group of Somali pirates captured a couple of days earlier in an
operation to recover a seized Russian tanker, apparently due to lack of a clear legal basis for prosecuting
them. See Ellen Barry, Russia Frees Somali Pirates It Had Seized in Shootout, N.Y. TIMES, May
8, 2010, at A4.
45.
Cf The chief prosecutor in Hamburg, Germany, where pirates caught by that country most
likely would be tried, who has been quoted as stating: "[T]he German judicial system cannot, and should
not, act as World Police. Active prosecution measures will only be initiated if the German State has a
particular, well-defined interest .. " Ewald Brandt, Prosecution of Acts of Piracy off Somalia by
German Prosecution Authorities, Presentation at the International Foundation for Law of the Sea
Conference, Piracy-Scourge of Humanity (Apr. 24, 2009).
46.

Anne Appelbaum, The Rule ofLaw Walks the Plank, WASH. POST, May 18, 2010, at Al 9.

47. See, e.g., United States v. Hasan, No. 10-CR-56, 2010 WL 4281892 (E.D. Va. Oct. 29,
2010); United States v. Said, No. 10-CR-57, 2010 WL 3893761 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2010).
48.
See generally Matthias Gebauer, Horand Knaup & Marcel Rosenbach, First Trial of
Somali Pirates Poses Headache for Germany, DER SPIEGEL ONLINE, Apr. 20, 2010,
http://www.spiegel.delintemational/world/0,1518,689745,00.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
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Ashland, an amphibious assault ship. Both vessels were homeported in
Virginia, in Norfolk and Little Creek respectively; hence, the locus of the
indictment. All eleven men were charged with piracy, which, according to
18 U.S.C. § 1651, carries a mandatory penalty of life in prison.4 9 In
addition, the indictment also charged them with:
Attack to plunder a vessel, which carries a maximum of 10 years
in prison; [a]ssault with a dangerous weapon in the special
maritime jurisdiction, which carries a maximum of 10 years in
prison; [c]onspiracy to use firearms during a crime of violence,
which carries a maximum of 20 years in prison; [u]se of a firearm
during a crime of violence, which carry a mandatory minimum of
10 years in prison and a maximum of life in prison if convicted
of one count. The five men charged in the indictment involving
the U.S.S. Nicholas face two firearm counts, which would carry
an additional minimum of 25 years-to equal 35 years-in
prison if convicted of both counts.50
After pleading guilty on August 6, 2010 to attacking so to plunder a
vessel, engaging in an act of violence against persons on a vessel, and using
a firearm during a crime of violence, Jama Idle Ibrahim, one of the six men
involved in the attack on the USS Ashland, was sentenced to thirty years in
prison on November 29, 2010.51 The piracy charges against the six men,
however, had initially been dismissed by the federal district judge on
August 17, 2010 on the grounds that firing a weapon at a ship to force it to
stop and be boarded did not amount to an act of piracy. In analyzing the
piracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1651, the district court followed the defendants'
lawyers in applying the Supreme Court's definition of piracy as "robbery at
sea" from the 1820 case of United States v. Smith.52 As there was no
robbery alleged in the USS Ashland case, the court rejected charges of

49.
"Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations,
and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life." 18 U.S.C. §
1651 (1945).
50. See Press Release, United States Attorney's Office, Eastern District of Virginia, Alleged
Somali Pirates Indicted for Attacks on Navy Ships (Apr. 23, 2010), available at
(last
http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/04-AprilPDFArchive/l0/20100423piratenr.html
visited Mar. 14, 2011).
Press Release, United States Attorney's Office, Eastern District of Virginia, Somali
51.
Sentenced for Acts of Piracy Against the USS Ashland (Nov. 29, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/Pressrelease/l lNovemberPDFArchive/10/20101l29ibrahimnr.htmi
(last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
52.

United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820).
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piracy.s3 The district court apparently did not take account of the fact that
Article 15(3) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas,5 4 to which
the United States is a party and which therefore, according to Article VI § 2
of the U.S. Constitution, forms part of the "supreme law of the land,"
defines piracy as including "any act of inciting or of intentionally
facilitating an act described" as piracy in the two preceding paragraphs.
Two months later, a different judge in the same district court reached the
opposite conclusion, upholding charges of piracy.56
In the only other pending U.S. prosecution involving Somali pirates,
Abduwali Abdukhadir Mus6, charged, inter alia, in connection with the
April 2009 attack on the Maersk Alabama, on May 18, 2010 pleaded guilty
in a Manhattan federal court to two felony counts of hijacking maritime
vessels, two felony counts of kidnapping, and two felony counts of hostagetaking. Mus6's guilty plea pertained foremost to his participation in the
April 8, 2009 hijacking of the Maersk Alabama container ship in the Indian
Ocean, and the subsequent taking of the captain of the ship as a hostage, in
addition to his participation in the hijacking of two other vessels in late
March and early April of 2009 and related hostage-taking. Prosecutors
reportedly will seek a sentence between twenty-seven and thirty-three years
imprisonment. Commenting on the case, Preet Bharara, the U.S. Attorney
for the Southern District of New York, underlined that the Maersk Alabama
hijacking and the events leading up to it "make clear that modem-day
piracy is a crime against the international community and a form of
terrorism on the high seas."5 s On February 16, 2011, Mus6 was sentenced

53.

See generally John Schwartz, Somalis No Longer Face Federal Piracy Charges, N.Y.

TIMES, Aug. 18, 2010, at A16.

54. United Nations Convention on the High Seas, art. 15(3), Sept. 30, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. The United States appealed this decision to the U.S. Fourth
55.
Circuit Court of Appeals: United States v. Said, No. 09-7168, 2010 WL 331416, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 26,
2010).
56. See Opinion and Order, United States v. Hasan, No. 10-CR-56, 2010 WL 4281892 (E.D.
Va. Oct. 29, 2010).
57. See Ray Rivera, Somali Man Pleads Guilty in 2009 Hifacking ofShip, N.Y. TIMES, May
19, 2010, at A21; Cheryl Robinson, Somali Pirate Pleads Guilty in Maersk Alabama Hyacking,
CNN.coM, May 18, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-05-18/justice/new.york.pirate.plea_I_maerskalabama-hijacking-somali?_s=PM:CRIME (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
58.
Press Release, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigations, Somali Pirate
Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to Maritime Hijackings, Kidnappings, and Hostage Takings
(May 18, 2010), available at http:/Inewyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrell0/nyfo051810c.htm (last
visited Mar. 14, 2011).
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to thirty-three years and nine months in prison, the maximum penalty under
the stipulated sentencing-guideline range.5 9
In the first piracy related case before German courts in about 400
years, the indictment charges the ten suspects with the joint criminal
enterprise of disrupting maritime traffic along with hostage-taking and
extortion, punishable according to sections 316c and 239a of the German
Criminal Code. The Somali men are accused of attacking the MS Taipan
some 530 nautical miles east of the Horn of Africa. The crew evaded
capture by hiding in a so-called "panic room." Dutch naval forces, as part
of the EUNAVFOR operation "Atalanta," eventually boarded the ship,
apprehended the pirates, and handed them over to Germany. According to
the District Attorney's Office, in case of conviction the pirates face a
maximum sentence of fifteen years of imprisonment. Among preliminary
objections raised by the defense team at the beginning of the trial were
questions as to the legality of the capture by Dutch naval forces and
subsequent extradition to Germany. The trial is taking place in the district
court of Hamburg, the home port of the MS Taipan.60
What is worth noting is that while the piracy related cases before U.S.
courts were mainly based on a specific piracy provision in the U.S. penal
code (18 U.S.C. § 1651), referring to the "crime of piracy as defined by the
law of nations," whereas the German case, in lack of such an explicit legal
provision, is based on provisions of the penal code that may, for the most
part, be applied to a broad range of criminal activities not at all depending
on a nexus with piracy, and lacking a reference to piracy as defined in
international law. Furthermore, though perhaps not surprisingly, comparing
the applicable sentences (even if taking into account the distinguishableness
of the various cases), there is a significant difference between the two
countries in regard to the maximum sentence likely to be handed down if
the suspected pirates are to be convicted, ranging from up to fifteen years of
imprisonment in the German case, and up to thirty-five years (and a
minimum of twenty-five years) of imprisonment in the cited U.S. cases.
The still reigning confusion, however, even within the same domestic
jurisdiction, and sometimes within the very same district court, may be
59. Chad Bray, Somali Man Sentenced to More Than 33 Years in Hiacking of Ships, WALL
ST. J. ONLINE, Feb. 16, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487033734045761
48393224867726.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2011).
60.

See Johannes Ritter, Auftakt

FRANKFURTER

ALLGEMEINE

ZEITUNG,

im Piratenprozess: Erpresserischer Menschenraub,

Nov.

22,

2010,

http://www.faz.net/s/RubFC06D389

EE76479E9E76425072BI96C3/Doc-ECB061BB8C9FE4A5E945AICE0578AFD2B-ATpl-Ecommon
-Scontent.htmI (last visited Mar. 14, 2011); Germany'sFirst Pirate Trial in 400 Years Opens, MAIL &
GUARDIAN ONLINE, Nov. 22, 2010, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-11-22-germanys-first-pirate-trialin-400-years-opens (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
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gauged by the diverging outcomes of initially similar piracy cases (as in the
U.S. example), highlighting the continuing inadequacy of domestic piracy
prosecutions.
The establishment of jurisdiction is not yet settled regarding cases
where the nationality of the apprehending forces is different from the ship's
flag state, and the still inadequate comparability and case law of piracyrelated offences; thus, sentencing practices represent shortcomings of, and
challenges to, national prosecutions for piracy. At least some states have
ventured into putting piracy on trial, despite the costs of trial and the
potential ensuing political asylum claim concerns. However, the majority
of states still appear to have an aversion towards such a level of
involvement.
States unwilling to prosecute suspected pirates, not least Western
states, often cite a lack of adequately implemented international treaties or
national laws pertaining to piracy prosecution,6 evidentiary problems (the
sort of evidence acquired and the mode it had been acquired may not live
up to the high Human Rights trial standard in the respective countries), and,
although less readily admitted, concerns for potential asylum claims by
suspected, and convicted pirates, as reasons for their refusal to prosecute.
While the first two aspects quite tellingly seem to constitute less of a
concern, once piracy suspects are transferred to a more regionally
connected third country (where available laws, and attention to Human
Rights standards, most often are not really superior to the ones available in
the transferor state), the asylum concern (for example, Norway's Mullah
Krekar case) 62 is at least a real, although perhaps not sufficiently, serious
61.
In addressing those concerns, S.C. Res. 1918, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1918 (May 27, 2010),
proposed by Russia, calls on all states to make piracy an offense under their domestic law and asks the
UN Secretary-General to prepare a report on possible institutions to try pirates. Ironically, or in any
case as an illustration of the urgency of implementing domestic piracy legislation, a mere two weeks
later, the Russian navy released Somali pirates far at sea, citing precisely a lack of a clear legal basis for
prosecuting them. Barry, supra note 44. Following up on UN SC Res. 1918, the Legal Committee of
the International Maritime Organization, conducted a review of national legislation among Member
States, not surprisingly confirming previous assessments which concluded that "implementing
legislation on piracy is not currently harmonized among the 40 States" which replied to the IMO's
request for submission of national legislation on piracy. See Int'l Maritime Org. [IMO], Legal
Committee, 97th Sess., agenda item 9, [MO Doc. LEG 97/9, Sept. 10, 2010, available at
http://www.amtcc.com/imosite/meetings/IMOMeeting2OlO/LEG97/LEG%2097-9.pdf (last visited Mar.
14, 2011). In furtherance of its mandate to assist States in the uniform and consistent application of
provisions of UNCLOS, the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (Office of Legal Affairs)
now serves as the depository of a database containing a table of national piracy legislation based on the
IMO's survey, and information about other States, see http://www.un.org/depts/los/piracy/
piracynational legislation.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
62.
Mullah Krekar, a Kurdish Sunni Islamist leader who came to Norway as a refugee from
Northern Iraq in 1991, had his refugee status revoked in 2003 due to terrorist acts carried out in
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one. After all, while asylum claims in the wake of piracy prosecutions, and
other serious crimes, are and will be a fact to be taken into account, in that
way the number of such asylum claims being added to the total number of
claims would amount to only a tiny fraction of the overall case load and, as
such, would not seem to justify a country refraining from actively taking
part in piracy prosecutions.
What is needed in any case is a comprehensive approach to modem
piracy legislation, addressing evidentiary and implementation concerns and
creating a broad basis of national jurisdictions with, as close as possible,
similar approaches, procedures, and sentences for comparable acts of
piracy-until, perhaps, a future international institution for such a purpose
may be established. One of the challenges of the UNCLOS consists in the
fact that, even if fully and widely implemented, this Convention is rather
silent (as opposed to the Rome Statute of the ICC) as to exactly what
jurisdictional steps a state is to take, what sentences to impose, mutatis
mutandis. While states having ratified the ICC Statute also still had to
implement the treaty through domestic implementing legislation, the ICC
Statute at least listed very specific minimum requirements, the floor, where
states were free to raise the ceiling in their national laws,63 applying, for
example, even higher standards with respect to the definition as to what acts
constitute genocide, as may be illustrated by comparing German and U.S.

Kurdistan by Ansar al-Islam, an Islamist group whose original leader, at the time, was Mullah Krekar.
Since February 2003, Krekar has an expulsion order against him which has been suspended pending
Iraqi government guarantees that he will not face torture or execution. Norway is committed to
international treaties which prohibit the expulsion of an individual without such a guarantee. The death
penalty remains on the books in the Kurdistan region and while most death sentences have been
changed into life sentences since the Kurdistan authorities took power in 1992, the exception being
eleven alleged members of that very group (Ansar al-Islam), who were hanged in the regional capital of
Arbil in October 2006. As of December 8, 2006, Mullah Krekar had been on the UN terror list, and on
November 8, 2007 he had been judged by the Norwegian High Court as a "danger to national security."
See Vilde Helljesen et al., Heyesterett: Mulla Krekarfare fro rikets sikkerhet, NRK, Nov. 8, 2011,
http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/1.3987075 (last visited Mar. 15, 2011), and Norges Hayesterett [Supreme
Court of Norway], Nov. 8, 2007, HR-2007-01869-A (case no. 2007/207) (Nor.). Despite repeated
threats to the lives of various leading politicians in his country of refuge, he remains in Norway
precisely because he might face the death penalty if deported to Iraq. See, e.g., Paal Wergeland, PST
vurderer 6 pagripe Mulla Krekar, NRK, June 11, 2010, http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/norge/1.7163982
(last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
In this same way, State legislatures within a federal republic, according to the "New
63.
Federalism," may raise the ceiling of (human) rights within their State constitutions (by containing a
greater number and broader definitions of rights) above the federal minimum floor. See Kermit L. Hall,
Of Floors and Ceilings: The New Federalism and State Bills of Rights, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS [N
MODERN AMERICA: AFTER 200 YEARS 202 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., Indiana
Univ. Press 1993).
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national legislation in that respect.6 UNCLOS, of course, is silent in regard
to sentences, and barely even imposes a duty on states to prosecute at all.
Thus, drafting more standardized, modem anti-piracy legislation, as a
minimum floor for national prosecutions, would be a worthwhile endeavor
in enhancing the prosecutorial regime to fight piracy, though it still would
leave the proclaimed problem of political asylum requests unaffected.
IV. A PIRATE AND A REFUGEE
While some of the concerns pertaining to potential asylum claims by
suspected pirates may be rejected, based on Article IF of the 1951 Refugee
Convention, pertaining to the exclusion of refugee status, that clause itself
may not be sufficient to put states unwilling to prosecute pirates in their
own courts at ease. To be sure, the so-called Exclusion Clause stipulates,
inter alia, that the provisions of the Refugee Convention "shall not apply to
any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering
that: (a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime
against humanity," or "(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime
outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a
refugee," or "(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations."6 5 Due to the vagueness of its wording,
subsection (c) has barely been used, and, depending on the particular case,
subsection (a) may be stretching the description of piracy too far, as may
also be apparent from the wording and language employed in UN SC Res.
1816 and 1838 pertaining to the situation in Somalia, mentioned

64.
The diverging definitions of genocide employed by Germany, a State Party to the Rome
Statute, and the United States, still a non-party to the International Criminal Court, are quite illustrative
with a view to the minimum floor versus the raised ceiling discussion. While the Genocide Convention
and the Rome Statute define genocide as the commission of certain criminal acts "with intent to destroy,
in whole or in part," a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, as such, 18 U.S.C. § 109 1(a) requires a
"specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part;" thus, limiting the applicability of the
provision quite distinctively. Section 6 of the German Code of Crimes Against International Law, on
the other hand, emphasizes that in certain cases the objective requirements of genocide may already be
fulfilled if the punishable conduct is directed at a single person. Thus, while the Rome Statue initially
refers to killing and causing serious bodily or mental harm to "members" of the group, and forcibly
transferring "children," the German domestic penal law declares that whoever kills or harms in a certain
way "a member" of the group, or transfers "a child" of the group may already be punishable for committing
genocide. For a more detailed discussion, see Tom Syring, The Crime of Crimes Before the Courts:
National and InternationalJurisdictionalApproaches with Respect to Punishing Genocide(forthcoming
2011) (on file with author).
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, GA Res. 2198 (XXI), 189
65.
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,
1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 19 U.S.T. 6223.
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previously. 6 6 However, in a recent statement regrding Article IF, the
UNHCR underlined that a "serious non-political crime" in the sense of
Article IF(b) could consist of arson and rape, but also murder and
robbery.
Thus, as many cases involving piracy may include some acts of
robbery or other "serious crimes" within the meaning of the Exclusion
Clause in Article IF, some refugee claims put forward by apprehended
pirates may be denied based on that stipulation. On the other hand, as the
majority of arrests by necessity pertain to unsuccessful pirates, and hence
involve inchoate acts, rejection of potential asylum claims may nevertheless
not be as readily available based on the Exclusion Clause contained in
Article IF. Furthermore, even where appropriate, a suspected pirate,
irrespective of the outcome of a potential trial, may not be returnable to
Somalia due to the principle of non-refoulement 8 and the well-known,
dangerous security situation in that country.
Therefore, either way, the unwillingness of states to share the judicial
burden of prosecuting pirate suspects based on concerns of potential asylum
claims being made by apprehended persons may be understandable, though
not equally justifiable. In any case, the problem now, it seems, consists not

66.

S.C. Res. 1836, U.N. Doc. S/Res/ 1836 (Sept. 29, 2008).

67. UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Statement on Article IF of the 1951
Convention, at 20, July 2009, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a5de2992.html (last
visited Mar. 16, 2011). While the statement was originally issued in the context of a preliminary ruling
referenced to the Court of Justice of the European Communities from the German Federal
Administrative Court regarding the interpretation of a qualification directive pertaining to the granting
of refugee status to persons included in terrorist lists, its interpretive value is valid in the present context
as well. Furthermore, the ECJ, in its decision on November 9, 2010, held that "support of an
organization included on the EU list of organizations involved in terrorist acts may, but does not
automatically, constitute a serious non-political crime or an act contrary to the purposes and principles
of the United Nations. . . ." According to the Court, a finding that there are serious reasons for such an
assessment is conditional, should be determined on a case-by-case basis, and will depend on the
particular circumstances of the case and an individual's responsibility for carrying out the acts in
question. See Tom Syring, Introductory Note to the Court of Justice of the European Union:
Preconditionsfor Exclusion from Refugee Status (Fed. Republic of Ger. v. B & D), 50 I.L.M. 114
(2011). Hence, even if an incident of piracy, in general, were to be subsumed under Article IF,
sufficiently establishing the respective pirate's particular contribution to the prohibited act may still pose
a significant challenge.
68. Refugee Convention, supra note 65, art. 33(1); Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 3(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988). "No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture." Id. See also supra note 62, discussing the Norwegian case Mullah Krekar of
which, although not pertaining to piracy, quite vividly highlights the limits of the Exclusion Clause
in Article IF.
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only in how to distinguish a pirate from a refugee, or even in how to prove
a suspect's pirate activity, but in how to deal with the insight that one
person may actually be both: a pirate and a refugee.

